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Abstract—Growing traffic demands and increasing security
awareness is driving the need for secure services. Current solu-
tions require manual configuration and deployment based on the
customer’s requirements. In this work, we present an architecture
for an automatic intent-based provisioning of a secure service
in a multilayer — IP, Ethernet and optical — network while
choosing the appropriate encryption layer using an open-source
SDN orchestrator. The approach is experimentally evaluated in
a testbed with commercial equipment. Results indicate that the
processing impact of secure channel creation on a controller
is negligible. As the time for setting up services over WDM is
varying between technologies, it needs to be taken into account
in the decision process.
I. INTRODUCTION
INTERNET proliferation has increased exponentially in thelast two decades, and it is estimated that 40% of the
population or more than 3.5 billion people have Internet access
[1]. The ability to reach a significant global population base
has been the primary driver for businesses to provide essential
services over this infrastructure. However, companies have to
contend with higher risk and potential costs associated with
data breaches. A recent study estimates the average potential
cost of a data breach to be as high as $3.6 million [2]. As a
result, it is critical to deploy solutions to secure the distributed
cyber infrastructure. Network encryption is a key component
in the cyber-security environment and is responsible for ensur-
ing that communication between two trusted endpoints cannot
be intercepted by malicious attackers. Network encryption
is crucial for communication mechanisms operating over an
untrusted public infrastructure. Consequently, protocols such
as Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) and Secure
File Transfer Protocol (SFTP) natively support encryption.
However, as applications move from dedicated physical in-
frastructure to distributed and virtualized infrastructure in the
cloud, many communication protocols, that do not natively
support encryption, can potentially be exploited by malicious
attacks.
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Given the large number of communication protocols, a
deployment of specialized mechanisms for each individual
protocol is not feasible and in-flight encryption is used as
a standard mechanism to secure these protocols. In-flight
encryption is applied to traffic on one of the lower layers of
the OSI model, i.e., physical (L1), data link (L2) and network
layer (L3). Protocol solutions operating at those network layers
(e.g., IPsec[3], MACsec[4], physical layer[5]) have inherent
technical (e.g., latency, effective throughput) and cost trade-
offs. In-flight encryption assumes that protocols that do not
support security mechanisms will be encapsulated into one
of these protocols. Specific implementations also differ in
the choice of mechanisms used for authentication, secure
key exchange, payload encryption and strategies for storing
encryption settings on end-devices. All of them determine the
complexity associated with breaking the encryption mecha-
nism.
Network service providers typically deploy infrastructure
with multiple, potentially vendor-specific, choices for in-flight
encryption. Manually evaluating the technical / cost and secu-
rity trade-offs between the possible solutions for an appli-
cation, requesting a “secure” connectivity service from the
infrastructure, poses a significant overhead. The evaluation
process also needs to be revised as the infrastructure deployed
by the service provider is changed. Furthermore, applications
are interested in satisfying their own requirements, which
commonly do not match the priorities of the network operator:
while applications are concerned about bandwidth, latency,
availability, security, etc., management systems are optimized
to minimize the usage of resources, the energy consumption
and so on. In theory, applications should be able to clearly
define their needs without getting into details on how the
service is created. This corresponds to the concept of an
intent. On the other side, network control mechanisms should
be designed in order to manage the different layers of the
infrastructure in such a way that the parameters of interest for
operators are optimized, while providing the necessary set of
resources to satisfy applications’ requirements. With respect
to the scenario presented in this paper, this may imply that
the type of in-flight encryption chosen for the secure service
may vary according to the specific needs of the requesting
application, e.g., for very low-latency applications physical
layer encryption may be preferred over higher network layers.
Throughout this paper we will use the term in-flight encryption
for describing the process of applying a technology to encrypt
traffic. The secure service is used in the context of a connection
that is transferring traffic that needs to be secured by some kind
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(a) Encryption at the IP layer reusing existing (optical)
connections between the routers.
R1
R2
R3
(b) Encryption at the physical layer requiring the setup
of a new lightpath (blue solid line).
Fig. 1. A network consisting of routers and optical equipment. The red lines indicate established connections between the routers. The dashed blue line
represents the resulting secure service between R1 and R3 by applications with different requirements.
of (in-flight) encryption mechanism.
Applications need a way of describing requirements directed
at an underlying network in a technology-agnostic manner.
The main contribution of this work is the concept of an
automatic selection of the appropriate encryption layer in
a multilayer IP / optical network based on requirements that
are expressed by an application through intents. The goal
is to move the decision complexity away from the applica-
tion requesting the service toward the orchestrator. Intents
define the application’s requirements (e.g., bandwidth), cost
constraints, and application type, which in turn may constrain
the choice of the technology used for the secure service. This
concept is experimentally validated with an implementation
using an open-source controller and commercial hardware.
The controller is responsible for receiving and translating
application’s intents into network requirements, evaluating the
related trade-offs and constraints, and eventually provisioning
a secure service that can be used by the application. Finally,
the implementation is complemented by measurements and an
evaluation in a real testbed equipped with optical and Ethernet
equipment.
II. SECURE SERVICES
Service providers used to deploy separate networks to host
enterprise and end customer services. However, such an ap-
proach is not scalable in economic terms as the infrastructure
is duplicated and underutilized. Current deployments are based
on unified networks implementing an IP architecture, which
means that all traffic flows share the same infrastructure. As
a result, more and more businesses are investing in improving
their security infrastructure.
End-to-end encryption was used widely to protect the
transfer of very sensitive information, e.g., online banking.
However, the general public has developed concerns about
confidentiality on the Internet in recent years, due to e.g., open
WiFis and pervasive monitoring. This has led to a widespread
utilization of HTTPS for the Internet traffic, mainly driven
by the over-the-top providers. The percentage of HTTPS and
HTTP requests was 14% - 86% in January 2015, 24% - 76% in
January 2016 and 50% - 50% in August 2017 [6]. End-to-end
encryption is flexible and independent of the underlying net-
work infrastructure, making it relatively easy to deploy. This
flexibility comes at the cost of higher processing requirements
on both — server and client — communication endpoints,
which consequently induces more latency and reduces the
throughput of the network. When performing such tasks at
the network level, requirements on endpoint capabilities and
processing complexity are relaxed. Moreover, this allows the
network operators to optimize the cost per bit for encrypting
traffic between two remote sites. Different mechanisms such as
IPsec, MACsec, and custom all-optical encryption differ in the
cost of deployment, availability, latency and throughput. The
selection of the best encryption mechanism for the applications
is a feature that the network must provide in order to optimize
the application’s experience, while providing the most cost-
effective solutions. This is called a Secure Transmission as a
Service [7], which can be seen as being part of the Security
as a Service model [8].
Let us explain secure services and their assignment to
network layers using an illustrative example (Fig. 1). We
assume a regular carrier network composed of IP and optical
equipment. For the sake of simplicity, one router is collocated
with every optical device and both are connected to each other.
The red lines represent an existing connectivity between the
routers over optical. The blue dashed line shows the resulting
connection between the endpoints. Finally, the blue solid line
indicates a newly set up optical connection. We consider
two applications requiring a secure service between the two
routers R1 and R3. One of them has only a small bandwidth
demand and does not provide any further constraints. The
secure service will be routed over an end-to-end IPsec tunnel,
reusing existing optical connections (Fig. 1a). However, a
second application requests not only security, but also a high
bandwidth, so it will be more cost effective to use an encrypted
optical circuit to minimize the network resource utilization
(Fig. 1b). In general, this encrypted optical connection needs
to be setup exclusively on demand.
Current research on security in SDN is focusing on con-
trollers and the communication between the control and data
plane [9], [10], [11]. Even though the data plane is also con-
sidered in isolation, the work is mostly limited to OpenFlow
switches [12]. Therefore, it is concerned with preserving the
integrity of flow tables and flow rules [9]. Eavesdropping
is a general threat in computer networks and it applies to
the electrical [13] as well as the optical domain [14]. A
natural countermeasure is encryption. In OpenFlow networks
3TABLE I
OVERVIEW OF ENCRYPTION LAYER PROPERTIES.
Requirement IPsec (L3) MACsec (L2) Physical (L1)
Latency high medium low
Data Throughput low medium line speed (no overhead)
Protocol Transparency low medium high
Flexible Encrypted Payload Size restricted restricted (standard MAC) 1G – 100G
End-to-End Compatibility IP only layer 2 only Fiber / OTN or SONET / SDH
Flexibility (Meshed) high low medium
encryption of packets may result in matching issues because
some headers are no longer accessible. Our work tries to fill
this gap by providing a solution for eavesdropping at the
data plane for secure services in a multilayer environment.
This paper is based on previous work carried out by the
authors. In [15] we provided a proof of concept (PoC) based
on ONOS (http://onosproject.org/) for an automatic secure
service instantiation at the IP and optical layer and evaluated
the overhead introduced by the processing in the controller.
We extended this PoC by including MAC layer encryption
and using a high-level intent interface developed in ACINO
(http://www.acino.eu/) [16]. The work at hand demonstrates
how ONOS’ existing intent interface with minimally invasive
extensions can be used to select the proper layer for encryp-
tion. Newly developed components for ONOS, like domain
intents and a driver for transport networks, are integrated
and an updated intent compiler is introduced. Finally, the
evaluation of the compilation process and of the setup and
tear down times provides insights into additional constraints
for the proper selection of the encryption layer.
III. ENCRYPTION MECHANISMS
The main purpose of an encryption mechanism is to pro-
tect the user data against eavesdropping. The choice of the
encryption mechanism depends on the requirements of the
application. In this section, we describe the general principles
behind in-flight encryption services, and compare various
properties of physical layer encryption, MACsec and IPsec.
They are summarized in Tab. I These properties are used by the
orchestrator to assign an appropriate encryption mechanism
to the requested secure service. The configuration of an
encrypted connection is a multi-step process. First the two
endpoints need to be authenticated, which means identifying
the other side as the expected communication partner. This
can be done by a pre-shared key, username / password based
authentication, or using certificates. In our evaluation, we
use pre-shared keys for all mechanisms. The encryption
mechanism needs two cryptographic primitives: a symmetric-
key algorithm and a key exchange protocol. A symmetric-key
algorithm is used to provide data confidentiality. It is called
“symmetric” because the same key is used for encryption and
decryption. The most popular symmetric-key algorithm today
is the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), which we use in
our experiments. A key exchange protocol, on the other hand,
is based on public-key cryptography and it is used to derive a
symmetric session key for the AES encrypted communication.
The Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol can establish
a symmetric key securely over a public channel. The evaluated
mechanisms use various incarnations of the DH protocol. Note
that the symmetric key is regularly refreshed in order to limit
the amount of data that is encrypted with the same key.
Physical layer encryption [5] is a point-to-point Layer 1
encryption over the optical fiber. In this mechanism, the
hardware encrypts the Optical Channel Data Unit (ODU)
payload before inserting it into the Optical Channel Transport
Unit (OTU) frame, which is decrypted at the peer site. Because
the payload of an Optical Transport Network (OTN) frame is
encrypted with no additional overhead, it offers a high protocol
transparency. This approach provides the lowest latency and
highest throughput, i.e., line speed, among the presented
mechanisms. The bulk data encryption is typically done by a
symmetric-key crypto algorithm, such as AES, and the session
key can be established by a key exchange protocol, such as
authenticated DH key exchange. The drawback of physical
layer encryption is that it is bound to custom hardware at
both endpoints of the infrastructure and the setup time roughly
corresponds to a lightpath provisioning.
The Media Access Control Security (MACsec) is a security
protocol for Ethernet links (Layer 2) and enables secure
communication between neighboring nodes. Each packet is
encrypted using symmetric key cryptography so that the com-
munication cannot be monitored or altered while traversing
the link. The symmetric key is established by a higher-level
protocol by which the endpoint authentication and the key
agreement are performed. The protocol is part of IEEE Std
802.1X-2010 [17]. The MACsec data frame, defined by IEEE
Std 802.1AE [4], adds a security tag and an integrity check
value to the Ethernet frame. Both are checked by the receiver
to ensure that the data has not been compromised while being
transmitted over the link.
Since MACsec is a simple protocol, it is used to achieve
a high speed transmission with low latency / overhead on
Ethernet links. However, when data traverses multiple hops,
where MACsec encryption is enabled on the Ethernet link,
each L2 device must encrypt / decrypt the frame. This may
cause performance degradation, compatibility problems and
security issues, if an intermediate device is untrusted. Also,
addressing / reachability limitations of Layer 2 apply.
Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) [3] is an end-to-end
security protocol on the network layer (Layer 3). IPsec can be
made transparent to end users since intermediate routers have
no means of decrypting the packets. Also, unlike others, the
communication in IPsec usually uses multiple secure channels
and has different keys to communicate with different destina-
tions. For these reasons, IPsec forms the basis of many Virtual
Private Networking (VPN) solutions. Services encrypted with
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Fig. 2. Basic system architecture of the ACINO orchestrator.
IPsec are more independent from the infrastructure and flexi-
bly deployable at many points of the network.
In IPsec, the entire IP packet is encrypted and authenticated
by the initiator and a new IP header is added to route the packet
to its destination. The encrypted IP packets pass through the
network without change until they reach the destination. A
major drawback of IPsec is its complexity and the introduced
latency [18]. It also significantly enlarges the size of the IP
header, which causes network inefficiencies and adds penalties
in the form of latency and reduced throughput to the overall
solution cost.
IV. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The intent-based multilayer orchestrator, developed in
the ACINO project and available at https://github.com/
ACINO-H2020, is an open-source effort built on top of ONOS
[19]. Many extensions, with the goal of making it more appli-
cation centric, have been introduced to the original controller.
The ACINO orchestrator’s simplified high-level architecture is
presented in Fig. 2. Starting from the top, the intents, issued by
a client application, are submitted through a REST northbound
interface (NBI). The orchestrator routes the request through the
intent framework, compiles the submitted intent and selects
the actions that need to be taken to satisfy the intent. Those
actions are mapped to the appropriate transport representation
per device and sent through southbound protocols to the
devices that need to be configured. The devices themselves
are either accessed directly or through a mediation layer
like an intermediate controller, e.g., a network management
system (NMS). Protocols for southbound interactions include
OpenFlow, NETCONF and RESTCONF. The latter two define
only the transport protocol and require YANG models for
the description of the content, e.g., the ONF Transport API
(TAPI) [20]. In any case, specialized drivers are implemented
to handle the device specific behavior that is not covered by
the common protocol definition. The communication with the
optical devices is done through ADVA’s NMS, which exposes
an experimental TAPI interface. The hardware side comprises
optical equipment with physical layer encryption capabilities
— on a subset of the ports — as well as switches which are
{
” t y p e ” : ” A c i I n t e n t ” ,
” appId ” : ” org . o n o s p r o j e c t . c l i ” ,
” p r i o r i t y ” : 100 ,
” c o n s t r a i n t s ” : [
{” t y p e ” : ” D o m a i n C o n s t r a i n t ”} ,
{” t y p e ” : ” E n c r y p t i o n C o n s t r a i n t ”} ,
{
” t y p e ” : ” B a n d w i d t h C o n s t r a i n t ” ,
” bandwid th ” : 10000000
}
] ,
” one ” : ”7E : 1D: D7 : 7 7 : 7 E:06 /−1” ,
” two ” : ”CA: B8 : 5 3 : D4 : 2A:84/−1”
}
Fig. 3. Request for an encrypted service in a JSON representation that can
be submitted through the NBI.
able to install encrypted tunnels, i.e., MACsec. Even though,
routers could be easily included, they were omitted because
of missing support for IPsec in the available hardware.
Next an example work flow for installing an intent is
given to explain the process in more detail. An application
centric intent (ACI) is submitted through the NBI. It defines
requirements of the application, like bandwidth, latency and
encryption. This intent is handed over to a specialized compiler
that is able to handle ACIs. Since in the case of an optical
network multiple devices are controlled through a single entry
point, i.e., the mediation layer, the compiler needs to be
able to create a special intent type, called domain intent.
Those domain intents are then installed through a protocol,
e.g., RESTCONF, and the corresponding driver, e.g., TAPI.
Devices outside this domain, like switches, are still configured
individually through OpenFlow.
A. Domain Intents
Domain intents are an important prerequisite for installing
services in the optical domain. They have been developed
in the ACINO project in collaboration with other institutes,
contributed to ONOS (https://github.com/opennetworkinglab/
onos) and merged in version 1.10.0 (Kingfisher). The default
approach in ONOS is to configure devices individually. This
method might be feasible in a network with switches and
routers, but for optical networks and other domains managed
by controllers it leads to increased complexity. One reason is
for example the setup of lightpaths through a network. Besides
configuring analog parameters, like launch power, the process
itself needs a particular structure, e.g., equalization and hop-
by-hop setup of lightpaths. Additionally, a local controller
might have a better knowledge about the domain because
of additional information or a view without abstractions. To
handle intents for domains a specialized processing needs to
be applied. The main idea behind those intents is to configure
parts of the network that are under control of a single controller
and therefore, part of a domain. A domain intent contains the
ingress and egress points and might also contain information
on a preferred path inside the domain. It is assumed that the
local controller is able to do all the required steps to fulfill
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Fig. 4. Testbed setup in the lab based on commercial networking hardware.
the incoming requests. Without an included path the domain
controller can compute a valid path for provisioning. In the
second case, it needs to verify the feasibility of the requested
path / configuration before installation. In order to activate the
domain processing an NBI intent needs to indicate this via a
flag (DomainConstraint in Fig. 3).
B. TAPI Driver
Even though ONOS provides numerous implementations
of protocols out of the box, they only cover the common
behavior in most cases. To apply a protocol based on a YANG
description, it is currently necessary to extend one of those
protocols with the details of a particular implementation.
We implemented the Transport API (version 1.1) based on
the definition that is available at github (https://github.com/
OpenNetworkingFoundation/Snowmass-ONFOpenTransport).
The REST southbound protocol was used as a basis and
starting point. One advantage is that it supports intermediate
controllers. The TAPI is used for topology discovery,
which includes nodes and links, as well as service setups.
The topology is exposed by the underlying controller, the
individual elements are extracted and then exposed to ONOS
by the driver. Most information is directly mapped to available
entities, some additional data is needed in order to be able
to set up connections. This information is stored in the
form of annotations, compliant with ONOS’ architectural
requirements.
C. Extensions for Encryption
The task of introducing an intent-based secure service
setup to ONOS, that automatically assigns the best layer
of encryption, includes many steps. Extensions start at the
northbound interface with the definition of new primitives
that allow the extended intent compiler to make a decision
regarding the right layer of encryption for every request. Then
the compiler has to install the resulting secure service using
new functionality in the drivers, including protocol extensions.
The enhancements of the existing ACINO orchestrator imple-
mentation [21] affected in particular the northbound interface,
the intent processing and the southbound interface (SBI). Like
listed before, some of them have been already presented in
[15], [16]. Here, they will be explained in more detail.
At the NBI the changes revolved around the extension of the
ACIs. The encryption flag is a part of the intent that activates
the intent processing that is needed for secure services. Those
intents can be submitted via ONOS’ NBI or the command
line interface (CLI). One example for an application centric
intent is shown in Fig. 3. It is noteworthy that the domain and
encryption constraints are part of the request. This initiates a
special handling by the intent compiler. The default compo-
nents like source (“one”), destination (“two”) and bandwidth
are reused for the encryption.
The ACI compiler was extended to support the processing
of intents that want to establish a secure service. Considered
constraints include availability, bandwidth and latency. A re-
striction or selection of the layer is considered a technological
detail and therefore, not included in the intent. In the presented
evaluation, the best layer for the encryption was chosen based
on the bandwidth. The main reason is that we do not want to
occupy more resources than needed, e.g., we use two optical
ports and one path in total for a 10G connection instead of 20
1G Ethernet ports and 10 paths through the network. In addi-
tion, the two encryption mechanisms have similar properties
in our testbed with respect to latency. In a multi-hop scenario
this would be a differentiator because MACsec introduces
latency by encrypting and decrypting at every hop along the
path. Finally, we do not have any competing requests for the
available resources in our evaluation, so that the availability
is not an issue. A future implementation of the compiler
needs to consider the limited resources and make a decision
also based on availability. Therefore, secure services with a
6high bandwidth demand are mapped to physical encryption,
while the ones with a lower demand are mapped to MACsec.
If the encryption flag is missing, the (existing) unencrypted
handling is applied. The compilation process also needs to
take the properties of the available resources into account.
For this reason the devices and ports have been annotated
with information about encryption capabilities. This way the
compiler can check if an option, satisfying all constraints, is
available. If this is not the case, the intent is marked as failed
and the user has to decide how to proceed. At the end, the
compiler also has to communicate the need for an encryption
to the underlying network.
The SBIs needed to implement new functionality to discover
encryption capabilities and propagate encryption requests to
the underlying hardware and mediation layer respectively. For
the retrieval of information about the encryption capabilities
of the hardware, TAPI’s label fields are used to indicate if a
device / port is capable of providing encryption and on which
layer. For the service setup it is expected that the compiler
chooses a correct pair of endpoints, otherwise the service setup
and therefore, the intent will fail.
V. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
As shown in Fig. 4, the presented system architecture was
implemented and evaluated with commercial hardware in a lab.
The testbed comprised two off-the-shelf PCs for representing
the hosts and two servers running the ADVA NMS and ACINO
orchestrator. In addition, the two PCs hosted an Open vSwitch
(OVS) instance each. Those virtual OpenFlow switches were
used to steer the traffic into the right direction, depending on
the encryption scheme, and were also under ONOS’ control.
Both servers (not shown) were connected to the optical equip-
ment as well as the OVS instances through a management
network. The testbed included an ADVA FSP3000 ROADM
ring consisting of three nodes. Two of them were equipped
with 10G AES cards [5] which encrypt all traffic on the
physical layer. Also, two ADVA FSP150CC XG210 were part
of the setup. Those Ethernet demarcation devices are capable
of encrypting the traffic using MACsec and were connected
directly to each other. The secret keys for the encrypted
connections were preconfigured by the administrator. For the
unencrypted connection two 100G multiplexer cards were
used. We evaluated three scenarios, of which two requested
a secure service and one needed an unencrypted connection.
For the first two, the best suited layer for the encryption was
chosen automatically by the orchestrator.
VI. MEASUREMENTS
We conducted experiments for two layers of encryption,
i.e., physical and MACsec, and for an unencrypted WDM
connection. Due to the software based implementation relying
on OVS and therefore limited comparability, we omit the
previously presented IPsec [15]. We did more than 595 test
runs for each of the three experiments. The resulting graphs
are presented in Fig. 5 and the results are discussed next.
First the time between the submission and the end of the
compilation process was captured (see Fig. 5a). The goal was
to evaluate if an additional delay was introduced by adding the
encryption processing to the pipeline. The measured times for
the forwarding and processing of all three intents are about the
same. For the encrypted intents the mean values are 11.7 ms
and for the unencrypted connection the mean value is 12.1 ms.
This might be related to the slightly different implementation
of the unencrypted branch. The margin of error for all of
them is below 0.14 ms for a confidence level of 95%. The
compilation time itself was below 1 ms on average and is
only responsible for less than 10% of the processing time. As
a result, we can state that the processing time remains about
the same independent of the encryption handling.
The second graph (Fig. 5b) shows the time it took the
SBI to complete the installation of the connection. There is
a big difference when it comes to the installation time of a
connection. For the unencrypted case, the mean value is about
99.1 s. On the other hand, the encrypted WDM connection
only needs 28.4 s. The significant difference in setup time
is a result of the used technologies. While the unencrypted
multiplexed 100G connection uses coherent detection, the
encrypted 10G applies direct detection. If both used the same
technology, the results would be similar because the encryption
has no influence on the setup time. As expected, the MACsec
setup, being based on an Ethernet connection, needs the least
amount of time (1.3 s) for setting up the connection for a single
hop. The purpose of this graph is to visualize the difference
in establishing a connection with growing capacity. Switching
from Ethernet to optical introduces a factor of more than
20. Delays in setup might lead to a preference of another
technology option and should be considered when fulfilling
applications’ intents.
The last graph (Fig. 5c) captures the time it takes to delete
an existing connection through the SBI. Those values decide
how long it takes before the resources are available again.
The teardown of a lightpath in the testbed takes 12.6 s for an
unencrypted and 11.8 s for the encrypted connection. Here,
the difference between a 100G and a 10G connection is not
very prominent. With 401 ms, MACsec is also the fastest when
it comes to the cleanup afterwards. The conclusion is similar
to the installation: the time for a deletion should be taken
into account. This time a factor of about 30 is introduced by
switching to optical, although the absolute difference is lower
than before.
In conclusion, even though the optical setup — encrypted
and unencrypted — takes longer in the beginning, it is required
for an efficient serving of higher bandwidths or to satisfy
latency constraints. Even from an economical point of view, it
can be better to assign a dedicated lightpath instead of reusing
higher layer transmission. MACsec has some drawbacks on its
own by applying encryption / decryption on every hop. While
the optical transmission can be used for long distances without
intermediate processing, Layer 2 technologies need multiple
hops to reach endpoints that are further apart. Another result
is that the type of appropriate encryption should also consider
the setup and teardown times. For short-lived connections or
demands that need to be fulfilled as soon as possible optical
connections might be unfit or need to be preprovisioned.
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Fig. 5. Measurements for the compilation, installation and deletion.
VII. OPEN ISSUES
The demonstrated automatic creation of secure services
presents a starting point for including data layer encryption
in SDN. Next we present a number of selected open issues
that we came across during our work.
A. Configurability vs. Ease of Use
This work demonstrates how extensions to intents can be
used so that a service is able to indicate its need for in-
flight encryption. However, the definition of encryption for
an application is not sufficient to specify requirements on mu-
tual authentication mechanisms, key exchange protocols and
algorithms for symmetric encryption. One possible solution
is the use of application types in the intent specification,
which are mapped to typical requirements in the respective
field. A related idea is to provide (governmental) applications
that rely on a high level of security with standard suites
that are defined for example by the BSI (Germany) or the
NIST (USA). The former proposal provides configurability,
but can become cumbersome for many application groups,
and the latter may not provide the level of detail required
for specialized applications with strict security requirements.
Further work is needed to evaluate the inherent trade-offs and
define a basic vocabulary to address these scenarios.
B. Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM)
Once provisioned, it is necessary to manage and monitor
secure services. This paper demonstrates abstractions for en-
cryption parameters that can be used for provisioning services.
Similar abstractions need to be defined to address encryption
specific OAM metrics in a layer agnostic fashion. The agnostic
treatment of a service (and related OAM parameters) is out of
scope of this work. We only propose an outline for metrics
and events that can be used as a baseline to define such
layer-agnostic encryption OAM parameters. Measurements
like last successful / failed key exchange, error counters for
failed key exchanges and time for which the service operates
in transparent (unencrypted) mode can be used as generic
measurement metrics. Encryption related events / alarms for
successful / failed mutual authentication operations, key ex-
change sequences, configuration change notifications and in-
ternal (encryption module) failures can also be gathered
independent of the layer. These parameters, coupled with
operational state indicators and management operations can
serve as an initial definition of OAM abstractions for layer-
agnostic secure services.
C. Security Issues
The introduction of a service that is targeted toward secure
applications is a likely candidate for malicious attacks. Secu-
rity of controllers / orchestrators has been addressed in other
studies [9], [11] and is not part of this work. The security of
the data plane poses fundamental challenges that need to be
addressed in the future. One such example is the configuration
of authentication mechanisms configured in the data plane,
which are important to mutually confirm the identity of the
communication partner. In this work, preconfigured keys in the
controller and shared secret based authentication mechanisms
were used at all encryption layers. The controller and the
8devices can mutually authenticate each other, but configuration
of keys (shared secret key, public and private keys) from the
application to the device should not include the controller as
an intermediate entity. Mechanisms to do the same remain an
open question in SDN. Another open challenge in the context
of SDN and secure services, especially at layer 2 and below, is
a mechanism to guarantee that the application traffic is using
the configured secure path.
D. Intent Negotiation
In this work, the PoC implementation demonstrates that the
orchestrator has an overview of all potential secure service
mechanisms, and can provide a single solution to the applica-
tion requesting the intent. The enforcement of constraints in
this implementation is strict. The orchestrator will fail to offer
a solution in case resources for encryption are not available in
the selected layer chosen by the compiler. Application require-
ments, however, can be fuzzy. Intent negotiation mechanisms
[22], [23] can be used to interact with the user and identify a
configuration which would be acceptable in case the originally
requested secure service cannot be provisioned.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In future SDN controlled IP-over-optical networks, ser-
vice requirements should be considered to provision services
tailored to the application’s needs and to optimize network
resource usage. The presented extended ACINO orchestrator
defines a lightweight northbound interface to specify the
applications’ needs through intents. In this paper we focus
on security configuration, since the choice of an encryption
concept depends on the intended needs. We have shown an
extension of our previously introduced automatic intent-based
multilayer secure service creation. The ACINO orchestrator
creates multilayer secure services. This approach has been
experimentally verified and evaluated in a testbed with com-
mercial optical equipment. We have verified that, based on
abstract requirements signaled by the application, the orches-
trator can select service parameters in different layers and
perform automatic multilayer secure service provisioning. The
performance measurements indicate that the additional time
for processing security features is negligible. In contrast, the
setup and teardown times vary a lot for different technologies
and hence should be considered when fulfilling applications’
intents. Since this approach is a generic concept, it could
also be applied to future technologies, like quantum-secure
encryption.
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